Part 2: Flexible battle transformation

The plot to “pull” our missiles out of Hanoi

Beginning with the thought of “a walk” in the Hanoi sky, in fact, after the first three days and nights of massively attacking the city, the U.S. Air Force suffered heavy losses. Eleven B-52s, together with dozens of aircraft of all kinds, were shot down in the sky of Hanoi.

Due to this defeat, the Vietnamese troops assumed that the enemy would adjust their forces and have a plan to fight back. According to Senior Lieutenant General Tran Viet Khoa, Director of the National Defense Academy, after suffering a heavy defeat in Hanoi on the night of December 20, 1972, the enemy turned to attack Hai Phong city and Thai Nguyen province. It was considered as an act of diversion of the enemy to “pull” our missiles out of Hanoi, and at the same time confirmed that B-52s would change the direction when attacking Hanoi again. On that basis, the Vietnamese troops still resolutely kept the missile force in Hanoi and at the same time added some units to protect the capital.

Lessons drawn after the successful shooting down of F-4s (A file photo)

To deal with the new tricks of the enemy, on the morning of December 21, Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army Van Tien Dung had a working session with the Command of the Air Defense - Air Force Service to direct all aspects of combat assurance, especially the preparation for the continuous and long-lasting fight against the enemy and strengthen the anti-aircraft artillery force to protect missiles and fight B-52s.

Following the instruction of the Chief of the General Staff, the Air Defense - Air Force Service mobilized two missile battalions 71 and 72 of Regiment 285 from Hai Phong to the North of Road No.1 to fight the enemy in the Northeast of Hanoi. At the same time, the Air Defense - Air Force Service mobilized Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment 262 from Thanh Hoa and Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment 223 from Nam Dinh to protect the missile force in the south of Hanoi. On December 21, there were nine missile battalions in Hanoi. The missile troops were now ready to fight the enemy in all directions. The adjustment optimally transformed the air defense posture in Hanoi to be ready to fight the enemy. Missile units were camouflaged during daytime, and focused on fighting B-52s during nighttime.

After the Christmas break, from the night of December 26, the enemy changed tactics, and the direction of attacks, focusing on numerous targets at the same time in a short time, while increasing jamming, sending more F-111 aircraft to attack airports and missile battlefields before B-52s came in to drop bombs. Hundreds of sorties of B-52s together with tactical aircraft attacked Hanoi, Hai Phong and Thai Nguyen at the same time. Thanks to good preparation in all aspects, and reasonable use of air defense forces, missile troops accurately discovered B-52s and tactical aircraft and mobilized four battalions to fight B-52s along their flight routes. Using this approach, on December 26, the Vietnamese air defense force shot down 18 planes of the enemy, including eight B-52s (four downed on the spot), and captured a pilot alive. On the following nights, the enemy had to gradually reduce the number of B-52 sorties.

In addition, after the first phase of the campaign, the missile force defending Hanoi, thanks to other units’ experience in fighting B-52s, quickly learned from previous battles to down more B-52s. The missile force in Hai Phong, although directly engaging in combat against B-52s in the battlefield, it was hard for it to shoot down B-52s as the terrains were treacherous. Two missile battalions 71 and 72 of Regiment 285 were mobilized from Hai Phong to operate outside Hanoi and then shot down B-52s in the inner city of Hanoi. That fact showed that the more flexible transformation of the battle position was, the more contribution it made to the victory.

Adjustment of the air force

The Pentagon held that the Vietnamese air force was the threat to the “U.S. Air Force,” so in the early days of the campaign, they intensified their raids at airports such as Da Phuc (now Noi Bai airport), Kep and Hoa Lac. Our air force was tasked with fighting the enemy in the outer area, but the taking-off area was inside the firepower area of our air defense forces. Therefore, when B-52s attacked, the missile force focused their fire on the enemy, but sometimes they had to stop to ensure safety for our aircraft. This limited the missile force’s capability. On the other hand, that Vietnamese aircraft took off from the center of the battlefield was a tactical disadvantage because it was difficult to take the enemy aback and to ensure accurate navigation.

Taking advantage of the Christmas holidays of the enemy, on December 25, the Air Defense – Air Force Service held a meeting to ensure collaboration between air and radar troops. At the meeting, the Command of the Air Defense - Air Force Service ordered affiliated units to bring aircraft to airports in the outer areas such as Yen Bai (Yen Bai province) and Cam Thuy, Tho Xuan (Thanh Hoa province) while ensuring secrecy when taking off and approaching B-52s.

In addition, a radar unit was mobilized from Hanoi to Thanh Hoa province while several radar and signal troops to another radar unit in Moc Chau (Son La province), contributing to forming a radar system for navigation in the inner and outer areas to support each other. With the allocation of radar stations on both sides of B-52s’ routes, the jamming was also less in the outer area and there were also fewer enemy’s aircraft to intercept the MiG-21. For our pilots, they were able to actively choose appropriate altitudes, velocities, and maneuvering methods to avoid the enemy’s interceptors in order to approach the target as fast as possible.

As a combat pilot who made excellent achievements in the Hanoi - Hai Phong Air Defense Campaign at the end of 1972, Lieutenant General and Hero of the People’s Armed Forces Pham Tuan said that after the first attacking phase of the enemy, the timely direction and flexibility of the Air Defense – Air Force Service helped the air force gain the victory. The actual situation of the second phase of the campaign showed that the secret transport of MiG-21s to the airports in the outer areas created conditions for the air force to shoot down two B-52s on the nights of December 27 and 28, creating a new advantage for our force, he added.

Translated by Trung Thanh