To help readers have deep insight into the operational art, the People’s Army Newspaper published a series of articles, titled “Operational Art in Hanoi – Hai Phong Air Defense Campaign in late 1972,” with historical witnesses and scientists’ analysis and perspectives.
Part 1: Determining main area, main object
Determining the main area and main object was an important and key factor in building operational plan. By thoroughly following situational developments and accurately forecasting the enemy’s schemes, Vietnam correctly identified the main combat area and object of the U.S. Air Force, thus building a firm air defense posture with the participation of three forces.
Attacking Hanoi to achieve strategic goal
“…In Vietnam, the U.S. will definitely lose. But it will only give in after losing in Hanoi’s sky.” In late 1967, President Ho Chi Minh made the prediction after carefully studying the plots and tricks of the enemy. Historically, before the end of wars that the U.S. had participated in, the U.S. used advanced weapons, including nuclear weapons to devastate big cities and headquarters to show off its strength and create advantages at the negotiation table. Germany’s Dresden (1945), Hiroshima and Nagasaki of Japan (1945), Pyongyang of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1950-1953) became ashes by the U.S.’s air raids. That scenario would be possible in Hanoi.
According to Major General, Prof. Do Minh Xuong, President of Army Academy, having studied the U.S.’s destructive war rules and analyzed the role of each operational area, we were determined that Hanoi was the target that the U.S. imperialists paid the most attention to. To dominate us in political realm, Nixon would use air power to attack Hanoi since it was the center of the revolution and the most sensitive place in politics. Therefore, only by attacking Hanoi could the enemy achieve the strategic goal of forcing us to accept their terms at the Paris Conference.
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Troops were determined to strictly observe all orders of the Supreme High Command. |
Determining that Hanoi was a main area, while preparing for the operation, we focused on building an air defense posture with different layers.
Lieutenant General Nguyen Xuan Mau, former Political Commissar of the Air Defense – Air Force Service and former Deputy Head of the Inspection Committee of Central Military Party Committee (present Central Military Commission), recalled that in 1972 air defense and air force troops simultaneously undertook three heavy tasks of joining the operation in the southern theater, protecting transportation lines in localities in Military Region 4, and fighting back the U.S.’s air raids in Hanoi and Hai Phong. In that circumstance, the air defense force had to split up to meet the above strategic requirements.
Lieutenant General Nguyen Xuan Mau said that in late 1972 we built a relatively firm air defense posture with missile regiments, anti-aircraft regiments, hundreds of militia and self-defense squads to protect Hanoi. Along with that, four fighter regiments deployed combat forces to inner airfields, ready to down B-52s and tactical aircraft in five directions around Hanoi. In addition, we arranged radar regiments in Nghe An, the Northwest, Quang Binh, and Vinh Linh (Quang Tri) to be present in the front line, ensure radar for air defense operation in the region, and detect B-52s.
Determining main object
The B-52 Stratofortress was credited as the main strategic bomber of the U.S. Air Force in its global military strategy. With a foresighted and sharp vision, President Ho Chi Minh predicted possible war situations for our military and people to get prepared. After bombing the Northeast region and Military Region 4 theater, we saw that sooner or later, the U.S. Air Force would attack Hanoi and provinces, cities, and towns in the North, and the B-52 was the main object we had to destroy.
Major General Nguyen Van Ninh, former Deputy Director of the Department of Operations, the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army, affirmed that only by shooting down B-52s and capturing pilots alive could we defeat the enemy's will, creating favorable conditions and opportunities for us on the diplomatic front and the entire Vietnam theater. Identifying the B-52 bomber as the main object was the art of choosing the enemy’s “fatal point” to attack, said Major General Nguyen Van Ninh.
According to Lieutenant General Nguyen Xuan Mau, in mid-May-1972, General, Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap asked Le Thanh Canh, Head of the Division of Operations of the Air Defense – Air Force Service “what would the percentage of B-52s shot down that the U.S. could withstand and continue to bomb be; to what extent it could shake the White House; and to what extent it would make the U.S. unable to stand it and lose?" After more than a week of research, the Air Defense – Air Force Service gave three answers. The percentage of B-52s being shot down that the U.S. could withstand and continue the attack (N1) would be from 1% to 2%. The percentage of downed B-52s that could shake the White House (N2) would be from 6% to 7%. The percentage of B-52s being shot down that could force the U.S. to lose (N3) would be over 10%. Comrade Le Van Tri, Commander of the Air Defense – Air Force reported to General Vo Nguyen Giap and promised that the service would strive to achieve N2 and N3 targets.
On June 26, 1972, General Vo Nguyen Giap directed comrade Le Van Tri to conduct battles with the participation of different arms to hit the enemy harder since the U.S. Air Force would fight more fiercely in the coming time.
In realizing General Vo Nguyen Giap’s directive, in July 1972, the General Staff opened a conference on how to shoot down B-52s and making preparations for the fight against the Stratofortress.
Determining that the B-52 was main object, we used SAM-2 missiles to fight back. Lieutenant General, Assoc. Prof., Dr., Hero of People’s Armed Forces Phan Thu, former Deputy Defense Minister, recalled that in April 1972 we launched missiles, but failed to down B-52s in Hai Phong city. At that time, the U.S. side believed that SAM-2 was not its rival, but the Vietnamese air force was.
The Pentagon’s Generals made a statement that by electronic technology, the U.S. Air Force could blind the entire air defense system of Vietnam and bomb any target in its North territory. Those assessments made American pilots, especially B-52 pilots, subjective and arrogant.
Lieutenant General Phan Thu said that SAM-2 missile had been technically improved many times, so the technical features of SAM-2 missiles in 1972 were superior to that of SAM-2 missile in 1965. To protect Hanoi, the missile formation was arranged to ensure that troops could shoot down B-52s on the main direction, fight the enemy from other directions, and support each other.
Missile Regiment 261 (Division 361) arranged on the left bank of the Red River to attack B-52s flying in the main direction from the Northwest of Tam Dao to Viet Tri junction and enemy forces coming from the Northeast. Meanwhile, Missile Regiment 257 (Division 361) on the right bank of the Red River was tasked to down B-52s flying from Ba Vi and Road 6 to Hanoi and enemy troops from south and southeast direction. When Missile Regiment 274 was reinforced to protect Hanoi, it quickly consolidated forces, restored weapons, and was ready to fight the enemy in the direction of southwest and south of Hanoi.
Former Deputy Defense Minister Pham Thu said that when B-52s attacked Hanoi, they were no longer supported by jamming devices, creating favorable conditions for SAM-2 missiles to down them.
(to be continued)
Translated by Tran Hoai