PANO – When it first operated in the Vietnam War the B52 was the US Air Force’s strategic bomber and considered a flying fortress. Yet the B52 has its own strengths and weaknesses. During the Campaign “Hanoi-Dien Bien Phu in the Air” in December 1972, troops of the Vietnamese Air Defence and Air Force were able to shoot down dozens of B52s as they actively studied and then grasped the operational laws and tactics of the B52.
In theory, when operating, the B52 was carefully protected. It often flew inside an extensive interference range and was escorted by a large number of fighter planes. However, Vietnamese troops drew some lessons through engagement and asserted that experience during operations revealed the B52 possessed a series of weaknesses.
Meanwhile, Vietnamese military experts and experienced air defence and air force officers examined the technical features, combat capacity, operational laws of the B52 as well as its strengths and weaknesses in order to draw up the most effective general combat plan for air defence and air force units. After careful examination, they concluded that Vietnamese air defence and air forces with the available weapons were able to shoot down B52.
In fact, the B52 was a gigantic bomber so its manoeuvrability was limited. When operating, it often flew at a stable speed and in a fixed line of flight. It also appeared with a special interference range, which radar troops could easily distinguish from others, and it always turned on lights when operating at night. In an attempt to attack Hanoi, B52s had to keep flying in a stable direction and when it dropped bombs, it was at the altitude that was within the range of fire of the SAM-2 (SA-75) and the operational scope of MiG 21s.
Regarding the electronic interference made by the US Air Force, although interference ranges accompanying with B52s were often extensive and jumbled up, their technical data and operations followed some laws. In addition, the enemy concentrated interference in front of B52s but forgetting its back, underneath and flanks, which Vietnamese air defence and air forces could take advantage of to shoot them down.
From the research, Vietnamese air defence and air force units sought out appropriate tactics and deployed forces to attack B52s at their weak points.
Nevertheless, it was not easy for Vietnamese radar troops to detect B52s. They had to exploit all the capacity of equipment and used their knowledge, experience and creativity in battles. From battle to battle, they gathered more and more experience in detecting B52s and later they could differentiate the enemy’s diversionary tactics from real B52s.
One of the successful battles of radar troops during the Campaign “Hanoi-Dien Bien Phu in the Air” happened on December 20th. On December 19th, Battalion 77 of Regiment 257 was ordered to move to Chem, Tu Liem district, Hanoi to ambush the enemy’s aircraft, including B52s, striking Hanoi from the Northwest. The air defence unit positioned its radars and missiles on the flanks of the line of flight of US aircraft.
At 4.39 am, the unit’s radar troops received clear signals from B52s. The information about the B52s was immediately reported to the battalion command. Missiles were ready to launch. The battalion commander decided to concentrate the unit’s power on a B52 and when the distance between the B52 and the unit’s battlefield was 36 km, its missiles were launched. A B-52D was shot down and crashed some kilometres away from the battlefield.
Following the victory of air defence forces, the Vietnamese Air Force also sought out methods to attack B52s in the air. On December 26th and 27th nights, pilots Pham Tuan and Vu Xuan Thieu quickly detected B52s as the enemy’s aircraft turned its lights on. The Vietnamese pilots secretly approached the US bombers and shot them down.
Translated by Thu Nguyen