Party serves as the decisive factor of the 1975 Spring Victory

To thoroughly comprehend the leading role of the Party in the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975, one should begin with a discussion on the leadership of the Party after the national resistance war against French colonialists.

After the Geneva Agreements were signed, the U.S. showed their true colors as they sought to replace France in Vietnam. In July 1954 at the Sixth Party Central Committee, the Party concluded that the American imperialists had become the enemy of Indochina.

During the 13th Party Central Party Committee in December 1957, the Party and President Ho Chi Minh issued a policy to simultaneously conduct two revolutionary strategies: the National Democratic Revolution in the South and the Socialist Revolution in the North. Of the two strategies, the latter aimed at building socialism in the North and was credited as being the deciding factor in all of the victories in the Vietnamese revolution in the new period, while the former aimed at fighting the foreign invaders and reactionary forces in the South. It was widely regarded as the key factor in deciding the final victory in the struggle for South liberation and national reunification.

Liberation Army’s tank storms Independence Palace, April 30, 1975. File photo

The Party also issued a policy for the Vietnamese revolution in the short run, as follows: Promoting institutions and socio-economic development in the North as a strong home-front for the revolution in the South; protecting and building forces, revolutionary bases and seeking the right path for the revolution in the South. Thanks to the timely and successful policy, people in the North achieved great success in building socialism, which included facilitating the national struggle against the foreign invaders and their puppet regime in the South. In the South, the Party found the right forms and methods to mobilize people from all walks of life for the national liberation war.

But the big change in the Southern revolution was made after the 15th Party central Committee issued a resolution in January 1959. Accordingly, the three-element force, the military system from the local level the Central, and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam were formed in the South. A large number of revolutionary bases were recovered and strengthened. Transportation routes, especially road 559 and sea path 759, were built, facilitating the transportation of logistics from the Northern Home-front to the Southern Battlefield.

The timely and effective support from the North helped the revolution in the South overcome a recession and critical challenges in the first years of the national liberation war. Starting in 1960, the revolution in the South changed from force consolidation to a position of proactively fighting the enemy. In fact, there were a number of uprisings in the South although they were small and only took place in some localities.

In the context that there were major changes happening in the world and in the face of the new domestic situation, the Party saw the need to complete a comprehensive direction for the Vietnamese revolution. The third National Party Congress created a resolution in September 1960, redefining the enemy of the Vietnamese revolution as well as clarifying the two strategies of building socialism in the North and revolutionary struggle for national liberation in the South. The resolution also gave general guidance to both socialism construction cause in the North and revolutionary struggle in the South. It also pointed out the dialectical relationship between the two strategies in the Vietnamese revolution by underlining the need to mobilize international support for the Vietnamese revolution and determining the road and approaches for the Southern revolution to defeat the first U.S. strategy in the South.      

Meanwhile, in order to respond to the Southern revolution, the U.S. and their lackeys in the South started their “Staley-Taylor” strategy, military operations and “Pacification” plan in the South from 1960.

In response to the enemy’s new scheme, the Party swiftly changed the method of the revolutionary struggle from uprisings in some localities to a total revolutionary war. The Party led the Southern armed forces and people to fight the enemy on both political and military fronts. They simultaneously conducted political protests, military operations and conversion of enemy troops in the three strategic regions, namely urban areas, rural areas, and mountainous areas. At the same time, the Party guided the revolutionary movement to gradually raise the level and scale of anti-revolutionary operations in an appropriate manner to destroy the enemy’s plan to build a “strategic village” model, intercept Saigon troops’ anti-revolutionary raids, and attack key enemy bases.

In fact, the Party analyzed and assessed the situation correctly, accurately predicted the future developments of the Southern revolution as well as swiftly recognized the enemy’s strategies and lined out responding policies. Furthermore, the Party was also flexible and proactive in responding to arising issues. As a result, the Southern armed forces and people defeated the “Staley-Taylor” strategy.

The Party and President Ho Chi Minh thoroughly analyzed both domestic and international situations and the U.S.’s strategies in order to forecast developments of the war exactly and issue guidelines in response to the strategies in a creative and proactive manner. When the U.S.’s “Staley-Taylor” strategy failed completely, the Party and President Ho Chi Minh predicted that the U.S. side would escalate the war and might launch airstrikes on the North.

When the U.S. deployed massive forces to South Vietnam, the Party assessed the current balance of power between our forces and the enemy’s correctly, from which the Party showed strong resolve to fight U.S. expeditionary forces and conduct offensive and defensive operations in a reasonable manner.

At meetings of the Politburo and Party Central Committee in 1967 and early 1968, the Party pointed out the need to make a big change in the situation to create a strategic advantage for our side while the U.S. was in a strategic dilemma. The Party believed that it was time for our forces to give strong, unpredictable, and decisive blows to the enemy to break down their will of the aggressors. At the time, the U.S. side was still anxious and nervous so an opportunity to create a turning point in the war was possible. So instead of mountainous areas and the countryside, the Party chose to attack big cities, particularly Saigon, Da Nang and Hue, where the enemy stationed important agencies and key forces but often had subjective thinking.

The Party’s strategic assessment and plan were realized on the eve of the lunar New Year 1968. Although the general offensive and uprising could not drive away the invaders and oust their lackey government, the offensive forced the U.S. to end its first bombing on North Vietnam and marked the failure of the U.S.-led “Joint Warfare.”  

In the face of the people’s increased revolutionary movements and our armed forces’ intensified military operations in South Vietnam, the U.S. Government had to withdraw a large number of U.S. troops from the battlefield of South Vietnam and started a new strategy named “Vietnamization.” The strategy, indeed, came from Nixon’s doctrine on the U.S.-led war in Indochina. In other words, the U.S. would reduce its engagement in the war, instead, it would feed an army of their local henchmen who would use U.S. weapons to directly fight their compatriots on the revolutionary side.

The Party foresaw the U.S.’s vicious scheme. As soon as the scheme was implemented the Party also recognized its weaknesses and led Vietnamese revolutionary forces to defeat the strategy. The Party and President Ho Chi Minh also predicted that the U.S. would launch air operations on the North with the use of its strategic B52 bomber when its “Vietnamization” strategy ended in failure. So the Party directed our forces in the North, particularly air defense and air forces, to prepare for a massive U.S. air operation in the late 1960s.

Thanks to the Party’s exact strategic forecast and well prepared air defense and air forces, our people and armed forces in the North defeated the U.S. Linebacker II in December 1972. The heavy losses the U.S. Air Force suffered during the 12 days of December 1972 in Hanoi airspace forced the U.S. Government to renew the Paris Peace Talks and sign the Paris Accords on Ending War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.

After the Paris Agreement, the U.S. continued its “Vietnamization” strategy by providing a good deal of economic and military aid to the lackey Saigon government. Meanwhile, the Saigon Army repeatedly launched military operations in the revolutionary force-controlled zones, breaking provisions of the agreement. Realizing the nature and plot of the enemy, the Party led our people and armed forces to promote economic development in the North while sending both human and material resources to the South, supporting the Southern revolutionary forces in their fight against the U.S. backed Saigon Army.

In May, June and July 1973, the Party Central Committee resumed meetings to discuss the enemy’s scheme. From October 1-4, the Party Central Committee had the second sitting session to analyze the developments on the South Vietnamese battlefield and assess the current situations in the country, region, and world. After the two sitting sessions, the Party came to the following conclusion: Resolutely fight the U.S. backed forces without compromise and flexibly lead the revolutionary movement in the South to victory.

As the U.S. started to reduce aid to Saigon as from mid 1974, the Saigon government and army experienced both political and economic crises. In this context, the Party led our people and army to actively build up forces. Large regular military units, especially strategic army corps, were established; a large number of volunteer youths were mobilized to build roads to the frontier; a huge amount of war machinery and logistics were transported to the South.

Following the Party’s direction, in July 1974 the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army started to draft a plan to liberate the South and reunify the country in the 1975-76 period. The plan was later revised with the following amendments: When opportunity appears our people and armed forces will resolve to liberate the South and unify the country in 1975.   

In October and December 1974, the Politburo and Central Military Commission had a meeting with the South Military Command. At the meeting, Party leaders and high-ranking military officers decided to liberate the South in 1975 and chose the Central Highlands as the main direction of attack for our forces. Later, three regular army corps 1, 2 and 4. Meanwhile, the entire Party, army and people were urgently making comprehensive preparations for the general offensive in 1975.

Seeing a strategic opportunity when the Saigon army lost their morale after suffering big losses on the Tri-Thien front, the Party decided that our army should open the Central Highlands Operation with a strategic blow on Buon Ma Thuot on March 10, 1975.

After several days of the Central Highlands Operation, realizing the enemy’s low spirits, the Politburo and Central Military Commission determined to liberate the South before the 1975 rainy season.

After the two important Central cities of Hue and Da Nang were liberated on March 26 and March 29, respectively, the Politburo decided to open the Ho Chi Minh Campaign to end the U.S.-back Saigon regime, liberate the South, and reunify the country. At 11.30 am on April 30, 1975, the flag of the Provisional Government of the Republic of South Vietnam was placed at the top of the Independence Palace, the headquarters of the Saigon government.    

The 1975 Spring Victory has become the greatest epic in the history of the Vietnamese people’s country building and defense. It marked a decisive turning point in the nation’s history and led the nation into a new era of independence, freedom, and socialism.

Since the end of the war, there have been a large number of domestic and international discussions on various aspects of the war. But whenever discussing how Vietnam’s great victory came to be, the Communist Party of Vietnam is always highlighted as the decisive factor in the victory.

In fact, since its inception, the Party has led the Vietnamese people to defeat all foreign invaders in the past wars and win a lot of impressive development in the current cause of building and safeguarding the country.  

Written by Major General Nguyen Ba Duong Assoc. Prof., Dr.

Translated by Thu Nguyen