A look at the bankruptcy of US “airlift” and “armor-lift” tactics in Vietnam

PANO – In mid 1961, the US and Saigon administration feverishly set up and herded people into “strategic hamlets” while mobilizing a large number of helicopters and carriers into their tactics of “airlift”, “armor-lift”, “casting the net and throwing the javelin”, “multiple-location encirclement” in an attempt to make full use of their advanced technology to destroy forces of the Vietnam Liberation Army.

At first, the situation in the battlefields became tense due to impacts of the enemy’s “airlift” and “armor-lift” tactics. On September 7^th 1962, at My Hanh Dong base, the Standing Committee of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) held a meeting with the Standing Committee of the My Tho provincial Party Committee to discuss the situation and find ways to counter raids and break the “strategic hamlet program.” Participants at the meeting issued a resolution, which reads, “Our armed forces have to expand their attacks in combination with forces inside strategic hamlets. Forces should dare to counter-attack enemies’ raids, not to avoid them. More preparation for fortifications was also to be made and there should be commune and hamlet levels and also the three-direction combat postures.”

Archived photo: US choppers employed in the "airlift" tactics

Under that resolution, in September 1962, Company 1 of Battalion 514 in coordination with local forces of Chau Thanh commune and guerrilla forces of communes south of Highway 4 successfully broke the strategic hamlet program and dealt heavy blows on two Saigon civil guard companies in Long Dinh sub-district during their raids. Our forces also defeated a battalion of the 7^th Division of the Saigon administration as its troops were lifted by helicopters with an aim to encircle our forces. Then, on October 5^th 1962, learning that our Company 1 under Battalion 514 was stationed in Cau Vong area of My Hanh Dong commune, the adversaries’ helicopters provided creeping barrage to clear the ground for an airlift of a special task force company to the area. With thorough preparation, Company 1 of the Liberation Army fought back bravely, gunning down three helicopters, neutralizing most of the Saigon troops... From the above results, a lesson was drawn, which was: “When our forces dared to fight and fight with good preparation of forces and fortifications, it was completely possible for our forces to earn victory over the adversaries’ raids”.

Basing on the developments on battlefield, in November 1962, Region 8 held a conference for cadres to promptly work out measures to counter enemy’s raids and completely fail the their strategic hamlet program. The conference agreed on three major points: Firstly, it was important to strengthen the political offensive, while conducting agitation drives among enemy troops and consolidating local armed forces. Secondly, armed forces were to operate at night to make ambush battlefields, proactively build trenches and fortifications to counter adversaries’ raids, and prepare fortifications in various different areas. Units were to quickly train their troops of new combat techniques with existing weapons and equipment to fight against modern equipment and tactics of the adversaries, capable of persistently keeping battlefields under control until after dark. Then, units were to move to new battlefields and continue to fight. Thirdly, units had to always fight in the combined three-direction combat posture, smoothly coordinating operations widely across battle spaces. Besides, the meeting also outlined a number of immediate measures and plans to ensure victories.

The conference boosted the morale of the entire Region 8. A high spirit to prepare for new combat posture was in place. The Battle of Ap Bac was where our troops compared wit and combat power with the adversaries. On our side, forces engaged in the battle consisted of a battalion comprising a regular company of the region and one company of provincial armed forces (capable of conducting alternative defensive activities to encounter adversaries’ raids and break the strategic hamlet program) in collaboration with one local platoon at district-level and commune guerrilla forces. These were assisted by forces engaged in military, political, and mobilization activities inside the enemy. As for the adversaries’ side, there was an overwhelming force of six infantry battalions, one armored company, 13 armed vessels, 33 aircraft (including airlift helicopters, combat helicopters, warplanes, transport and reconnaissance aircraft), three batteries of ten units, and mortars of all kinds. On January 2^nd 1963, after one day of combat, 450 enemy troops (including 11 American advisers) were neutralized; 16 helicopters were shot down; three M113 armored personnel carriers were destroyed; and two vessels were sunk.

This was for the first time our forces stayed engaged in combat with overwhelming forces of the adversaries in both troops and firepower and military equipment for a whole day. Ap Bac victory marked the start of the bankruptcy of the “airlift” and “armor-lift tactics, which had been considered the “key” of the US and Saigon troops during the “Special war” strategy. The Battle of Ap Bac proved that our forces with conventional weapons could fully place US modern tactics characterized with modern war facilities under control. It also marked a new development in the capacity of organization and command and coordination among forces in flexibly dealing with combat situations of our soldiers...