PANO – The Plain of Jars - Xieng Khouang Defensive Campaign is the first campaign carried out by the Vietnam - Laos coalition forces to defeat the encroachment of the Laos right wing army and the army of Thailand in the rainy season and to protect the newly-liberated area of Plain of Jars – Xieng Khouang. The campaign was also to maintain the strategic posture in Northern Laos in support of the strategic offensives in 1972 in Tri - Thien and North Central Highlands region of Vietnam. After the offensive campaign in April 1972 of the Vietnamese force, the enemy reorganized the force in four defensive areas surrounding the Plain of Jars. They are Sam Thong - Long Cheng area where 18 battalions (including 10 battalions of Thailand) were stationed, Long Hamlet area with five battalions, Tom Tieng - Pha Daeng area with nine battalions (two battalions of Thailand), and Sala Phukhun with nine battalions. The enemy deployed three artillery battalions (16 artillery guns) and two squadrons of T28 aircraft (nine aircraft) to these areas. By May 20th 1972, the enemy force in Military Region 2 (Laos) consisted of 76 infantry battalions and three artillery battalions.
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82mm mortar battery in the Plain of Jars – Xiengkhuang Defensive Campaign. Photo: Archived photo
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For our part, the Central Military Commission of Vietnam and Laos had agreed on the combat plan and informed the campaign command to switch to operational defensive campaign after the offensive campaign. Under that decision, the campaign command already made thorough preparation right after the offensive campaign to liberate the Plain of Jars and got more deeply into the Sam Thong - Long Cheng area. The coalition forces of Vietnam and Laos decided to proactively open a defensive campaign to defeat the enemy intention of reoccupying the area in the rainy season of 1972 while protecting the right flank for the strategic offensives in the Central Highlands and Tri - Thien region.
In early April, the command of the Plain of Jars - Xieng Khouang defensive campaign was set up including Campaign Commander Vu Lap and Political Commissar Le Linh. The area of the defensive campaign covered the quadrangle of Muang Sui - Noong Pet - Xiengkhouang town – and Tham Luang (60km in length and 50km in width), divided into five zones: the central zone (the Plain of Jars), the intermediate zone (Hin Tang), the secondary zone (Noong Pet), and two combined combat zones (Muang Sui and Xiengkhouang town). Each area included a number of key defensive posts. The Vietnamese force joining the campaign consisted of five infantry regiments (174, 148, 866, 335 and 88), two commando battalions, one artillery battalion, four anti-aircraft artillery and machine gun battalions, one tank battalion, and two engineering battalions of Vietnamese voluntary soldiers. On the Laos side, seven regular battalions, one tank company, two anti-aircraft machine gun companies, one engineering company, and four companies of local troops participated in the campaign. The forces were divided into two components: the in-place force and the mobile force. The in-place force consisted of two infantry regiments reinforced with one third of the tank and armored force and one forth of the operational artillery force. Each regiment was reinforced with different types of firepower for the defensive posts to conduct defensive operations and the mobile force to counter-attack the enemy. The mobile force comprised two infantry regiments (from March 10th 1972, the Ministry of National Defense further strengthened the force with one more infantry regiment) and the remaining two thirds of the tanks and armored force, and three fourths of the artillery force). In practice, the campaign took place in four stages in which the coalition forces successfully conducted three key battles, including the decisive one.
In Stage 1 (from May 21st to August 10th), the enemy air force attacked fiercely important heights and traffic roads, forming attacks from three directions on May 25th to the intermediate zone. On May 27th, the enemy took control of some key positions on the western part of Height 1800, Height 2063, and Tham Luang. The coalition forces counter-attacked and gained victory in Phu Phaxay, forcing the enemy of the southeastern attack direction to retreat to Tom Tieng (June 6th), recapturing Height 1800, wiping out six battalions (including two Thai battalions) of the enemy in Hin Dam and Tham Luang (July 3rd), pushing back attacks of the enemy in Muang Sui, while the commando and artillery forces were counter-attacking the enemy in Long Cheng.
In Stage 2 (from August 11th to September 10th), the enemy shifted attacks to the Plain of Jars, mobilizing ground force to hit the area in three directions (southeast, west and northeast), combining with airlifted force to attack Phu Keng in the northwest. The coalition forces promptly prevented and repelled the enemy in Phu Luang, Phu Hua Sang, Phu Thong, Five-peaked Hill, Height 1294, Lao Hamlet, Phu Hoc, while mobilizing forces to successfully implement the key counter-attacks in Phu Keng, destroying over 700 enemy troops (August 30th to September 3rd), taking control of the whole battlefield.
In Stage 3 (from September 11th to September 30th), the enemy sent reinforcements (six groupments and three battalions) to conduct attacks in the main direction of the west and sent special force to Talinoi to threaten the rear of the Vietnamese force, but without success.
In Stage 4 (from October 1st to November 15th), four groupments and two battalions of the enemy were mobilized in an effort to reoccupy part of the south of the Plain of Jars in an effort to place pressure on the coalition forces in political negotiation (October 15th). The coalition forces worked out appropriate plan to prevent, counter-attack, and break the operations while conducting raids to wear out the enemy’s strength. The operations formed the key battle to destroy most of the enemy forces from the south of Quay Hamlet to north Khang Kho (October 26th) and at the same time continued attacking and wiping out the enemy of the south of the Plain of Jars, forcing the enemy to retreat to Long Cheng.
At the end of the campaign, the coalition forces of Vietnam and Laos conducted 244 battles (Vietnamese and Laos forces conducted 170 and 74 battles respectively), destroying 5,759 enemy troops (179 captured alive), causing heavy losses to three groupments (21, 23, 26), three Thai battalions, and five other groupments, shooting down 38 aircraft, capturing 859 guns of all kinds (including four 105mm artillery guns and four 106.7mm mortars), completely defeating the large-scale military operation of the enemy, firmly safeguarding the strategic area.
After five months of operation, the enemy had to pull forces out of the Plain of Jars and the campaign ended on November 15th 1972.
The Plain of Jars - Xieng Khouang is the first complete defensive campaign of the coalition forces of the People's Army of Vietnam and Laos People's Liberation Army with innovative and efficient combat tactics. The campaign’s victory made major contribution to the enrichment of experience in conducting defensive campaigns and the development of the arts of campaign operations of Vietnam in the resistance war against the American imperialists.
The victory confirmed that this type of campaign is essential in any warfare. The Vietnamese and Lao soldiers through the campaign became matured both practically and theoretically in conducting defensive campaigns and defensive combat techno-tactics. It is the art of determining the right type of defensive campaign and proactively preparing and conducting defensive campaigns. Choosing the right defensive areas and attaching importance to the construction of the system of entrenchments are the basic contents in building the defensive posture to break the offensive of the enemy.
The highlight of the campaign is to form local defensive posts, considering them the core while setting up strong mobile forces to counter-attack and counter-raid the enemy. The art of using forces and creatively applying tactical and operational combat methods has seen a new development, combining defensive in the battlefields with continuously conducting counter-attacks. The forces were effectively employed so as to use weaker forces to deal with stronger ones during critical moments, knowing how to appropriately focus forces on pivotal battles to put an end to the campaign and gain victory.
Written by Nguyen Xuan Dai (Vietnam Institute of Military History)
Translated by Huu Duong