PANO – By August 1971, victories, continuously achieved by the revolutionary forces and people, made the Saigon Army retreat to the defensive position and resist our forces’ offensives. Taking the opportunity, the Politburo decided to open the 1972 strategic defensive in the Southeastern South, Tri-Thien and Central Highlands and shape a general offensive in the entire South Battlefield to decimate a large part of the enemy’s force, and extend the liberated zones. The policy aimed to force the USA to end the war at the negotiation table and our side was ready to prepare force to intensify fighting against the enemy if they kept waging war.

Under the policy, the South Central Command and South Military Commission opened a campaign named the national hero of Nguyen Hue in the Southeastern South led by Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra as the commander. The campaign took place from April 1st, 1972 to January 19th, 1973. The Campaign Command chose Road 13 as the main attacking direction in order to decimate enemy units in Northern Saigon, liberate Binh Long, Phuoc Long and several buffer zones in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong, creating a firm standing position for regular units of the South force to move from the borderline to the South, which then would coordinate with the main attacking direction in Tri Thien in 1972 in attracting and containing regular forces of the Saigon Army, creating an opportunity for the people in the Mekong Delta to rise up in arms and destroy the enemy’s pacification system.

Before the campaign, the Saigon Army had deployed a good deal of force in the region, which included four infantry divisions 5, 18, 25 and 21; one parachute brigade; five commando combat units; 456 tanks and armored vehicles; 396 cannons; 67 battalion-level units and 146 companies of the security force; and 820 partisan platoons.

Meanwhile, under the principle to launch large-scale attacks and disable parts of the enemy’s regular force, the Campaign Command mobilized a large force, which was instituted of three regular divisions 5, 7 and 9; three infantry independent regiments 24, 71 and 205; three local force regiments 4, 16 and 33; Commando Regiment 429; Regiment 42 and Battalion 28 of division-level Artillery Unit 75; two tank and armored battalions; four anti-air gun and artillery battalions. That was the first time in the resistance war against US invaders, our side had opened such an army corps-level joint force operation in the Southern South.

After actively and secretly preparing, at 4 am, April 1st, 1972, the Campaign Command ordered our units to fire off, assaulting the defensive system of Combat Unit 49 of the Saigon Army in Thien Ngon-Xa Mat. In response to our forces’ attacks, the enemy had to deploy troops to protect key positions along Road 22. But that was our forces’ diversion. Our regular units quickly took positions from the border areas to Road 13 (our main attacking direction) and started strong attacks on critical targets. Division 5 encircled the Loc Ninh grouping of bases. Division 7 controlled Road 13 from Can Le bridge to Chon Thanh.

While enemies suffered losses in the diversion direction, on April 5th, our force with infantry troops and tanks launched a surprise attack on the Loc Ninh military sub-region. On the afternoon of April 7th, our force occupied the Loc Ninh base. Hearing the news about the loss of Loc Ninh, enemy troops quit Bu Dop, Phuoc Long province, fleeing toward Phuoc Binh town. Enemy troops of Combat Unit 53 also left the Dong Tam base south of Loc Ninh and moved toward South and fell into an ambush laid by our force at Can Le bridge, which caused casualties to the enemy unit. The deed in Loc Ninh served as a source of encouragement for our troops across the battlefield.

After losing Loc Ninh, the enemy’s occupied town of An Loc was threatened. Therefore, the Saigon Government urgently increased the local enemy force to five combat units with maximum support of artillery and air force with the aim to fortify defensive positions around Binh Long and protect An Loc town. Under the new circumstances of the battlefield, on May 15, 1972, the Campaign Command decided to focus its force on attacking the enemy along Road 13, expanding the liberated zone in Binh Long and shaping a blockage of An Loc town.

From May 19th to June 21st, our forces and local people defeated two enemy operations to clear off way to the town in Tau O, causing large losses to enemy units, especially Division 21, Combat Units 15 of Division 9, Battalion 46 of Division 25, and safely protecting our base, the corridor and our liberated zone.

From October 1st, 1972, the Campaign Command set an objective to firmly protect Road 13 in order to lure more Saigon Army’s force, destroy the enemy’s pacification systems in Northern Binh Duong, Cu Chi, and annihilate enemy counterattacking forces and those who tried to attack the liberated zone. In the end of December 1972, enemy Division 5 launched an operation on the areas of Rach Bap-Dau Tieng, Road 14 and Long Nguyen-Minh Hoa, but they encountered strong resistance from our military forces and people and had to camp at the Dau Tieng, Ben Tranh rubber area. In the mid of January 1973, revolutionary regiments 14 and 209 launched various attacks on enemy Combat Unit 8 in Ben Tranh from different directions, forcing them to flee away. In the battles, our forces put 478 enemy troops out of action; as a result, the enemy did not have enough force to launch operations to retake Loc Ninh and other lost localities.

During more than 10 months of continuous attacks, the Nguyen Hue Campaign successfully concluded on January 19th, 1973. Our military forces and people in Eastern South, who had overcome numerous difficulties and hardship and undergone many sacrifices, disabled more than 13,000 troops, including 5,381 war prisoners.

The campaign results were reported as follows: The enemy Thanh Tuy Ha depot was attacked 4 times; five large stores in Bien Hoa, Long Binh and Tan Son Nhat were damaged; seven radar systems and 1081 military vehicles were destroyed; 201 vessels and boats were sank; 96,000 tons of bombs and ammunitions, 5,000 tons of chemicals and 74 millions of liters of petrol were wiped out; 897 aircraft were either shot down or destroyed; 282 military vehicles, including 12 tanks, 45 cannons, 6,837 guns of all kinds, 433 communication devices, 24 generators, 13,746 artillery shells and more than 50,000 mortar shells, rockets and anti-tank ammunitions were captured, by our forces.

The victory in the Nguyen Hue Campaign resulted from the success in the implementation of the timely, bold and proper strategy of the Party Central Committee, the creative leadership of the South Military Commission and Campaign Command, and the high will, high resolve and great effort to defeat the enemy of our military forces and people in the Eastern South.

The victory changed the power balance between our side and the enemy in the Eastern South, contributing to the general victory of the 1972 general strategic offensive.

Written by Le Minh Nam

Translated by Thu Nguyen