PANO – By the mid of 1965, the balance of power between our force and the enemy in the South Battlefield in general and Military Zone 5 in particular had changed. The Saigon Army was unable to take on its “mission” and was losing the initiative although the army had a large number of troops, was strongly provided with weapons and equipment, and directly backed by US advisors. In their implementation of the strategy “pacification”, although US advisors and the Saigon government sought and tried on many measures, they failed to “win hearts and minds” of people in the South; as a result, a number of newly-set up “strategic hamlet” systems were destroyed by South Vietnamese military force and people. In an effort to retake the initiative in the battlefield, the USA continued to introduce the Johnson-McNamara Plan. Accordingly, US Marine Division 3 was sent to Da Nang and at the same time, made up fake reasons to escalate the war, bringing war to the North.
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| Ba Gia combat plan |
For our side, after the An Lao operations, Military Zone 5 planned to launch a drive of Spring-Summer 1965 activities to fight enemies in the Central Highlands, Binh Dinh and Quang Nam. Particularly, in May 1965, the Military Zone 5 Command decided to launch the Ba Gia Campaign (the operations happened in Ba Gia, Northern Quang Ngai), aiming at decimating enemy forces, breaking down the local enemy paramilitary force, extending the liberated area, supporting the local political struggle, and linking between the mountainous area and the Middle Central delta. The campaign was directly commanded by Commander and Commissar of Military Zone 5 Chu Huy Man.
The Military Zone 5 Command mobilized 2 regular regiments (1 and 45), 2 local battalions (83 and 48), 2 local companies, local militia force, one commando company, 2 75mm companies, and one 12.7mm gun companies.
Meanwhile, the participating enemy forces included Infantry Regiment 51, Division 25, 2 task force battalions (37 and 39), one Marine Battalion 3, one armored unit, 6 105mm artillery batteries, one battalion and 15 security companies. With its outnumbered participating force, the enemy wanted to guarantee a victory.
Our Campaign Command set several operational principles, including attacking enemy bases in combination with annihilating enemy reinforcements on the road, and conducting both small- and middle- scale operations in a long time. The whole campaign lasted nearly 2 months from May 28th, 1965 to July 20th, and was divided into three stages:
The first stage from May 28th to June 7th: our forces used the tactic of attacking enemy bases to lure reinforcements and annihilate them. In the battles, our forces wiped out Battalion 1 of Regiment 51. The battles were summed up as follows:
Under the set plan, on the night of May 28th, our forces assaulted the enemy in Duyen Phuoc, but the enemy there moved away so quickly so the Campaign Command changed the combat plan. In line with the new plan, one infantry platoon conducted assaults on 2 enemy paramilitary platoons in Phuoc Loc. In danger of losing the locality, at 10 a.m., May 29th, Battalion 1 of Regiment 51 was sent to Phuoc Loc to rescue the enemies there. Foreseeing the enemy’s plan, our forces deceived the enemy and laid an ambush, waiting for the reinforcement. Exactly as planned, the enemy reinforcement fell into the ambush so after only 30 minutes fighting, our forces annihilated the whole enemy Battalion 1, when the enemies were on the way from the Nui Tron mount to Ba Gia. That was viewed as the first and key battle of the campaign.
In the supporting direction, Battalion 83 attacked enemy units garrisoned in the chief town of Nghia Binh district. For the enemy part, as Battalion 1 was eliminated, the enemy command mobilized a large number of enemy units and organized them into a combat unit, composed of Task Force Battalion 39, Marine Battalion 3, Battalion 2 of Regiment 51 and an armored unit, to free Phuoc Loc. They moved along Son Tinh-Ba Gia Road.
At 8 a.m., on May 30th, the enemy bombarded along the road to pave way for infantry units to advance. At 9.30 a.m., two groups of transport cars carrying enemy troops left Quang Ngai town for Phuoc Loc. The main group marched along Son Tinh-Ba Gia Road while the second group used small parallel trails 6km-8 North of Son Tinh-Ba Gia Road.
Grasping the enemy situation via reconnaissance, the Campaign Command was determined to mobilize forces to conduct a large-scale key battle. In fact, our forces with the good combat plan, careful preparation and high resolve gave surprising powerful blows to the enemy reinforcements. After 15 hours continuously fighting, our forces put the enemy combat unit out of action.
In the supporting direction, our forces also attacked the enemy stationed in Ve River town and backed local people to rise up breaking enemy-built “strategic hamlets”. On June 7th, the Campaign Command decided to conclude the first stage.
The second stage took place from June 10th, 1965 to 25th. During the stage, the Campaign Command had a policy to launch small- and middle- scale operations in support of local uprising movements to break down strategic villages.
Suffering heavy losses, the enemy could not afford to mobilize forces to retake the newly-liberated areas. On the contrary, they withdrew into entrenched fortifications and concentrated forces in local towns. In this context, the Campaign Command decided to organize battalion-level operations to attack the enemies stationed in the peripheries of the towns of Binh Son, Son Tinh and Quang Ngai; at the same time to assist local people in killing local anti-revolutionary elements and breaking down the local strategic hamlet systems.
The third stage happened from July 4th, 1965 to 27th. Our forces planned to attack the enemy Ba Gia station, and prepare for annihilating enemy reinforcements and consolidate the liberated zones on the other hand.
At 1.45 a.m. July 5th, our battalions 40 and 45 assaulted the Ba Gia station. After only 45 minutes, our forces annihilated newly-reinforced Battalion 1 of Regiment 51 garrisoned in the station. From July 6th to 19th, our forces conducted small operations in order to decimate the enemy’s force and extend the liberated zone.
The campaign was concluded and our side won a significant victory. Our forces annihilated 4 enemy battalions, caused damages to 2 other battalions, particularly put out of action 2,200 enemy troops, destroyed 15 military vehicles, shot down 18 aircraft, captured 973 guns of different kinds, backed local political movements in 29 communes of 6 districts of Quang Ngai province, and freed 167,000 from the enemy grip.
The victory held an important meaning, marking a development of the revolutionary movement in Military Zone 5 and the South in general. It also contributed to defeating the US Stanley-Taylor and Johnson-McNamara Plans.
The Ba Gia Campaign entered the history of the national struggles for national independence, freedom, peace and unification. The campaign also confirmed the tactic “attacking enemy bases to annihilate the reinforcement”, a development of the operational-level art in the beginning of the resistant war against US invaders. Other tactics that should be highlighted, include “Taking advantaged positions, provoking enemy and leading enemy to prepared battlefields”; and “Fighting moving enemy” at the operational level. What is more, during the operations, our forces drew valuable lessons and experiences in command and control at the operational level.
Evaluating the Ba Gia victory, General Nguyen Chi Thanh noted: “The Ba Gia victory in 1965 in Quang Ngai province was one of our forces’ great fights. For the first time, our forces have annihilated four enemy elite battalions. Especially on the two days of May 30 and 31, our forces wiped out a combat unit consisting of more than three battalions… For the first time, our forces dared to fight an outnumbered enemy with its firepower domination and annihilated a majority of them, captured a large number of enemy troops and weapons while our side suffered a few casualties.”
Written by Nguyen Ngoc Toan
Translated by Thu Nguyen