PANO – As of the beginning of 1968, US combat troops in South Vietnam mounted to nearly 480,000 and troops of US allies’ armies totaled 68,800. The figure of US troops excluded those who garrisoned in US bases in Japan, Thailand and the Philippines, and served in the 7th Fleet and 6th Fleet. Meanwhile, the number of the Saigon Army’s troops continuously increased.

With its large numbers of combat troops and modern weapons and vehicles, the enemy launched many operations to find and decimate our forces across the South Battlefield, particularly the enemy’s large-scale operations in the dry seasons of 1965-1966 and 196-1967. However, their operations did not gain their expected success. After two years from 1965 to 1967, the enemy lost the initiative in the battlefield: while they conducted offensives and attacks in 1965, after two years in late 1967, they had to draw to passive defense.

Meanwhile, as our army and people achieved many significant victories, the revolutionary position and force in the South saw new developments but the balance of power was not really in favor of our side. But from the deep analyses on the reality in the battlefield, the domestic and international situations, in late 1967, the Party, President Ho Chi Minh and army decided to lead the revolutionary struggle in the South to a new period. After a number of meetings discussing the possibilities and capabilities of our military and people, the Politburo passed the army’s plan to conduct a general offensive and uprising. The plan defined Saigon-Gia Dinh, Hue and Da Nang as the main battlefields, together with the special attacking direction of Road 9-Khe Sanh, which aimed at drawing enemies out of the cities and contained them in the Road 9-Khe Sanh battlefield.

In implementing the policy, on the night of January 20th, 1968, just 10 days before the General Offensive and Uprising, our regular divisions started operations in Khe Sanh. As soon as detecting our regular force in Khe Sanh, the US Command in the South sent 12 more battalions of a US airborne cavalry division, Airborne Division 101 and a marine division of the Saigon Army, to the location to respond to our operations.

During the enemy’s deployment of force in Khe Sanh, on the night of January 30th and 31st, 1968 (the eve and January 1st, 1968 on the lunar calendar), our armed forces and people, at the same time, attacked Saigon and more than 40 cities and towns, as well as the headquarters of four army corps of the Saigon Army in the South, 30 airports and about 100 logistic bases, which made both the US force and the Saigon regime surprised and horrified.

Troops on the way to Hue in the the General Offensive and Uprising.

 

In Saigon-Cho Lon, the center of gravity of the General Offensive and Uprising, where the headquarters of the US force and Saigon regime were located, our armed forces attacked the US Embassy to Saigon, Doc Lap Palace, the General Staff of the Saigon Army, Saigon Radio, Tan Son Nhat Airport, headquarters of the Saigon Capital Special Zone, headquarters of the Police and headquarters of US infantry divisions 1, 9, 25 and 101. Moreover, thousands of local people rose up to seize power and occupied a number of streets. In the battle on the US Embassy, 17 revolutionary commandos bravely fought against US guards and parachute troops for six hours, leaving a resounding impact on the US society and world.

In the Tri Thien battlefield, our armed forces attacked the headquarters of the Electrics, the Police, Provincial Head, MACV and Pacification Agency, as well as Tri Buu, Old Citadel, Height 49. Meanwhile, local people in Trieu Phong, Hai Lang and Ben Da, rose up in arms together with local armed forces to besiege enemies in the district hubs of Nhung bridge, Ben Da, controlled the Dien Sanh-My Chanh section of Highway 1, captured the district hub of Phu Loc, cut off the transport route on Highway 1 between Da Nang and Hue, destroyed the bridges of Cau Hai, Nuoc Ngot, and liberated the key coastal area, south of Hai bridge, and Truoi locality.

In Hue city, our armed forces and people controlled nearly all the nerve-centers, annihilated anti-revolutionary fiends, destroyed the enemy’s oppressive system, established a local revolutionary government  and built up a defensive battlefield. Being attacked surprisingly, enemy forces had to withdraw from Hue, but they then launched vigorous counterattacks on our forces. The two sides were struggling for single street corners, houses and road sections. On February 25th, our forces received an order from the higher command to withdraw from Hue after having captured the city for 25 days. On knowing that the enemy concentrated its forces on Hue, our forces took the opportunity, together with local people in the countryside, liberated large rural areas

For some people, the General Offensive and Uprising was only our operations during the 1968 lunar New Year Festival, but that indeed served as the first phase. In fact, the second and third phases of the General Offensive and Uprising continued to happen in summer and autumn of 1968.

The General Offensive and Uprising conducted by our armed forces and people in the South during the year of 1968 achieved great results. According to a report announced by the South Liberation Armed Forces Command on December 20th, 1968, our armed forces and people disabled 630,000 troops of the US Army, Saigon Army and US allies’ armies; one enemy brigade, seven regiments and combat units and 18 armored units were wiped out or suffered big losses; 13,000 vehicles of all kinds, 1,000 vessels and canoes were sank or damaged; 700 ammunition stores, 100 cannons and 15,000 bases, entrenched fortifications and governmental premises were destroyed.

The resounding victory in the South Battlefield and the feats of arms of the North in the first US-waged destructive war against the North completely defeated the US aggressive will and led the US strategy, known as Joint Warfare, to bankruptcy. From the time, the USA understood that it could not use its dominant military power to yield the Vietnamese nation and the single best way to end the war was to withdraw US troops from Vietnam and to sit for negotiations with the revolutionary side in Paris. The General Offensive and Uprising also left a strong impact on US society. From now on, the Americans better understood the nature of the war in Vietnam and more and more Americans went to protest the war.

The General Offensive and Uprising in 1968 has become a national eternal epic and marked a heroic period of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people in the national glorious history. It has also left a number of valuable lessons and military arts to the army and nation in current protection of the Fatherland.

Written by Nguyen Ngoc Toan

Translated by Thu Nguyen