PANO - The Binh Gia Operation was the first offensive conducted by the regular units of the Eastern South, contributing to changing the force scale between our side and the enemy in the battlefield and creating a new posture and strength to defeat the enemy’s Stanley-Taylor Plan and Johnson-McNamara Plan (the combination was called the strategy “Special Warfare”). The Binh Gia victory marked a big development of the South regular armed force and contributed to the operational-level arts of our army in the national resistant war against US invaders.
In the beginning of 1964, local political movements along military activities undermined the enemy’s policy on setting up “strategic hamlets/villages” (the enemy tried to relocate citizens to newly set-up villages in order to separate people from revolutionary forces) in the South Battlefield. Meanwhile, contradictions inside the Saigon government became deeper and the Staley Taylor Plan went completely bankrupt. However, with their nature of aggression, from March 1964, the US Army launched a new plan, named the Johnson-McNamara Plan, aiming to pacify the North in 18 months’ time in an effort to prevent the strategy “Special Warfare” from completely collapsing.
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| An US soldier creeping along the rice field to escape from the Liberation Army's shooting range. A filed photo |
In that context, the Central Military Commission, the South Party Central Committee and the South Command decided to open the Winter 1964-Spring 1965 Campaign in the Eastern South with Binh Gia as the key point of the operation, under the spirit of the 9th Meeting of the Party Central Committee. The Binh Gia operation, which took place from the night of December 2nd, 1964 to January 3rd, 1965, was divided into 2 phases: the first phase from December 2nd, 1964 to 17th, and the second phase from December 27th, 1964 to January 3rd, 1965.
Early on December 2nd, 1964, the operation started. The Operational Command entrusted Company 445 (local unit in Ba Ria province) to attack the Binh Gia “strategic village”, officially opening the campaign. However, when Binh Gia was attacked, the enemy reinforced Special Force Battalion 38 to the location and therefore, our force suffered heavy losses. Our command immediately drew lessons from the battle as follows: the participating force was not strong enough in terms of numbers and power so our troops could not conquer the village and when the enemy reinforcements came, our troops could not sustain the occupied positions and had to withdraw from the battlefield.
On December 7th, 1964, the Operational Command assigned Company 445 and Company 1 of Regiment 761 to assault Binh Gia for the second time, and ordered 2 battalions of regiments 761 and 762 to attack the enemy base of Dat Do to draw the enemy’s forces to that location. On the morning of December 9th, 1964, due to our strong attacks on Binh Gia, Duc Thach and Dat Do, the enemy organized a maneuver, named “Binh Tuy 33”, using Armored Unit 3 to clear away our forces along Road 2 toward Binh Gia, Duc Thanh. But when enemy armored cars returned from Duc Thach, they ran into an ambush laid by our forces. Our troops cut off the enemy lineup and assaulted enemies in confusions. After 1 hour, our forces wiped out the enemy armored contingent, annihilated 14 M113 armored cars, 100 enemy troops, including 9 US advisors and 5 Saigon Army’s officers, and captured a large number of weapons and equipment. That was the first time, our force had wiped out an entire enemy armored car unit, defeating the enemy’s tactic “transporting armored car” and succeeded in eliminating enemy reinforcements.
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| US helicopters and ground forces in the Vietnam War. A filed photo |
Entering the second phase, the Operational Command mobilized all forces to attack the “strategic village” of Binh Gia. Most of our forces participated in attacks on Binh Gia but some firepower segments were used to threaten the enemy subzone command of Duc Thanh, forcing them to send reinforcements there. The remaining force of Regiment 761 was deployed to be ready to fight enemy reinforcements on land and by air. On the night of December 27th, our forces conquered Binh Gia. On the following day, the enemy sent Special Force Battalion 33 to rescue Binh Gia. Foreseeing the enemy’s plan, our already-deployed air defense gun unit shot down 12 helicopters, denying the enemy from landing their troops onto Binh Gia. As a result, they had to land troops onto South of Binh Gia, where our troops had laid an ambush and were waiting for them. As soon as enemy Battalion 33 landed, our troops fired all kinds of weapons at them and advanced to raid the remainders. Only a few enemy troops could escape but a large majority was killed on spot.
On December 30th, Regiment 761 brought down a reconnaissance helicopter carrying US advisors. The Operational Command decided that the enemy sent troops to the location to find the remains of the US advisors, so it assigned a contingent to the location. As predicted, on the afternoon of December 31, enemy Marine Battalion 4 went to the location to search the remains of the US advisors and fell into an ambush. Our troops fired at them and wiped out the enemy battalion with nearly 600 troops. After 7 days fighting with the enemy in Binh Gia, our forces achieved large victories. On January 3rd, 1965, the Operational Command ordered to conclude the Binh Gia Campaign.
The Binh Gia Campaign marked a big development in terms of tactics, especially the tactic of luring enemy reinforcements to our laid ambushes. The Operational Command’s decision on taking Binh Gia “strategic village” as the main battlefield of the campaign was also proper and wise as Binh Gia served as a valuable political and military target and a link of the chain to protect Eastern Saigon. Moreover, Binh Gia was considered by the Saigon regime a model “strategic village” since it was home to Saigon troops’ families and anti-revolutionary elements. As a result, when Binh Gia was attacked, the enemy immediately sent reinforcements to rescue, which created good opportunities for our forces to ambush and annihilate reinforced enemies.
Although the Binh Gia Campaign was relatively small in terms of level, it bore strategic- and operational- level meanings and especially our forces summed up the military art of “building up strong positions, provoking primers”, a unique and creative fighting method of the South regular force. The campaign left valuable lessons and experiences for our forces to apply in next operations.
Written by Vu Binh Tuyen
Translated by Thu Nguyen