PANO - After more than one month continuously conducting offensive and uprising, our military forces and people achieved great victories, annihilating a large number of enemy troops, smashing an enemy military zone and army group, and ruining the power system of the Saigon regime in 16 provinces, five cities. Head of the Saigon government, President Nguyen Van Thieu urged the Saigon Army to fight to death to protect the remaining land, especially Saigon. The Saigon government reinforced troops to defend two directions: North and Northwest of Saigon.

Meanwhile, our army grew up from the battles and had high fighting spirit, will and resolve, which was considered a favorable condition for our army and people to realize the national desire of liberating the entire South and unifying the country. Under the instructions from the Politburo, the Central Military Commission and General Command, our forces concentrated all units to attack the headquarters of the Saigon regime, which was defended by the enemy’s most battle-hardened and powerful units, in order to end the war.

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The enemy’s force included Army Group 3 (four divisions), one marine brigade, two parachute brigades, one armored cavalry brigade, three regiment-level commando units, 19 artillery battalions, 800 aircraft, 862 vessels and boats, and quasi-military units of security force, police and militia.

Our participating units included four army groups 1, 2, 3 and 4; army group-level Unit 232. In more details, our side had 15 divisions, one brigade and four regiments of infantry; 20 brigades and regiments, and 8 battalions of artillery; three regiment-level units and 6 battalions of tanks and armored cars; 8 regiment-level units and two battalions of commando; one missile regiment; some aircraft and vessels; and local forces. The Campaign Command was led by Van Tien Dung as the commander and Pham Hung as the political commissar.

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On April 26th, our forces laid siege to Saigon and deployed units in 5 directions: Army Group 3 responsible for the Northwest, Army Group 1 – the North, Army Groups 2 – the Southeast, Army Group 4 – the East, and Unit 232 and Division 8 of local force – the West and Southwest. At 5 pm on April 26th, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign to attack the nerve-center of the Saigon regime started. From April 26th to 28th, our forces broke through the enemy’s outer defensive line, captured a number of important targets, namely Long Thanh, Trang Bom, Nhon Trach and Ba Ria town, cut off the enemy’s transportation route of Road 4 from Saigon to Western South provinces, blocked and paralyzed Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhat airports. On April 29th, our forces wiped out all enemy units in the outer defensive line and captured enemy bases of Nuoc Trong, Long Binh, Thanh Tuy Ha, Dong Du and Hau Nghia town.

On the morning of April 30th, our forces launched a general assault on the center of Saigon. Our military contingents attacked and quickly controlled enemy’s important military and civilian headquarters, including Tan Son Nhat airport, the General Staff, the Saigon Capital Special Zone and the Police Agency. At 11.30 am, one of our military contingents took control of Doc Lap Palace and captured the whole cabinet of the Saigon government, forcing President Duong Van Minh to declare unconditional surrender. Alongside military attacks, the people in Saigon rose up in arms to gain power in 107 streets, wards and districts of Saigon.

On May 1st, our forces and people of Military Zones 8 and 9 attacked enemy’s military forces and civilian power systems in the Mekong Delta, liberating the entire South.

In the Ho Chi Minh Campaign and operations in the Mekong Delta, our military forces and people annihilated and captured some 250,000 enemy troops, 5,000 cannons, 400 tanks and armored cars, 800 aircraft, 600 vessels and boats, 3,000 military vehicles, 270,000 guns of various kinds.

In terms of military arts, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign was an excellent example of the operational coordination among military services, arms and forces and the large-scale combination of military operations and people’s uprising. Under the leadership of the Politburo and Central Military Commission, our military forces and people took the good opportunity to launch a decisive strategic battle on Saigon, the nerve-center of the Saigon regime to liberate the South and unify the country.

Before the campaign, our side had built up a high-level people’s warfare posture; as a result, during the campaign, our side had enough conditions in position and strength to create opportunity for our forces and take the opportunity when it came. Based on our people’s warfare with two forces and three armies, our side could at the same time conduct a general offensive and uprising successfully.

Before the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, our side with military operations had laid siege to Saigon, separating Saigon from the Mekong Delta. Our side had also built a strategic corridor linking between our rear and front and the corridor continued to be expanded and completed by time. Prior to the campaign, our side had put out of action some 35% of the enemy’s total number, destroyed 40% of their logistic bases and 40% of their total weapons and equipment. Therefore, our forces overrode the enemy in terms of troop numbers, weapons and equipment and logistics. What is more, people in the South made a great contribution to the general offensive and uprising, speeding up the collapse of the Saigon Army and government.

The victory also resulted from the proper decisions of the Campaign Command as leaders concluded that our main operational targets were the enemy’s regular units in the outer defensive line and military and political headquarters in the center of Saigon. Still, the Campaign Command was right in assigning appropriate units to attack appropriate targets; combined between attacking the outer defensive line and using several units to thrust into the key targets in the center of Saigon; closely coordinated forces in conducting military operations and uprising.

Written by Nguyen Trong Thanh

Translated by Thu Nguyen