Bau Bang - Dau Tieng Campaign (November 12th

PANO - After the defeat in Binh Gia in 1964, signaling the risk of bankruptcy of the US special war strategy, Dong Xoai and Ba Gia campaigns in summer of 1965 totally pushed the strategy to go bankrupt. In response to the situation, the US imperialists massively sent US troops to South Vietnam, starting the strategy of "localized war" with the goal of "seek and destroy and pacification to crush the backbone of Viet Cong.”

In October 1965, the US 1^st Infantry Division and the 3^rd Brigade were dispatched to Lai Khe. In early November, the 3^rd Brigade assigned two battalions stationed to Bau Bang, ready to join the Saigon government’s troops in launching an operation in the liberated areas to relieve pressure and provide supplies for Dau Tieng. In Bau Bang - Dau Tieng area, one US infantry division ("Big Red Brother" Division) and seven regiments of five divisions of Saigon troops were stationed. The troops were ready to conduct the "seek and destroy" strategy of the "localized war" of the US. These were the first moves of the US to regain the initiative in the battlefield.

Students of Lai Uyen Secondary School visiting Bau Bang Victory Monument

On the Vietnamese side, the Southern Command decided to open Bau Bang-Dau Tieng Campaign to wear out part of the enemy’s forces and break their "seek and destroy" operation. The campaign was also to collaborate forces of the entire southern region to fight the US "localized war" strategy. The Campaign Command included Le Trong Tan (Campaign Commander) and Hoang Cam (Campaign vice-Commander, Chief of Staff). Forces participating in the campaign consisted of Infantry Division 9, one battalion of Binh Duong province’s local armed forces, guerilla forces of Bau Bang, Dong So and local people in the area.

In October 1965, the Campaign Command launched the attack in Dau Tieng area with an aim to destroy the reinforcement forces and prepare battlefields in both areas where the enemy’s forces were expected to land. The Vietnamese forces were fully equipped with weapons while political work was carefully carried out, raising the morale among soldiers to build up high determination to beat the US troops.

While we were quickly preparing the battlefield, on November 11^th, the US forces dispatched two battalions to the south of Bau Bang village, preparing to open the “seek and destroy” operation and provide support for the Saigon government’s troops in Dau Tieng.

Under these new developments, the Campaign Command decided to launch the attack destroying the two US battalions in the areas of Bau Bang and Dong So. Division 9 quickly formed the attack directions. The primary direction attacked the enemy from the east, the diversion direction from the south, and the disruption direction from the west to the east. On receiving the order, our forces quickly captured positions, forming a siege around the area where the enemy was stationed.

In the early morning of November 12^th, our troops conducted a sudden attack against the enemy in Bau Bang. After overwhelming the battlefield for nearly three hours from 5:00 am to 8:30 am), our troops successfully retreated to safe locations, long before the enemy’s B52 bombers bombarded the area.

The attack left heavy damage to two US infantry battalions, one US armored combat unit and a lot of weapons and equipment. This was the first battle that Vietnamese forces attacked the US forces in daylight and was also the key battle to open the campaign with efficiency.

After Bau Bang, Division 9 moved to Dau Tieng area, ready to counter-attack enemy’s raids. On November 21^st, Battalion 4 ambushed and attacked the enemy on Cam Xe - Dau Tieng Road, destroying 20 military vehicles and killing nearly 100 American troops. On the same day, Regiment 3 hit the enemy in village 10, destroying one battalion and 26 vehicles.

On November 26^th, in the area north of Dau Tieng, Battle Group 7 (equivalent to a regiment) of the Saigon government’s troops stopped in Tam Village. On receiving the order to attack this unit, Regiment 1 of Division 9, on the morning of November 27^th, used all its three battalions and reinforcement forces to form three directions attacking the enemy forces in the rubber forests. The battle was fierce and lasted over noon. Vietnamese forces destroyed most Saigon forces, capturing 700 troops, including a lieutenant colonel, CO of the battle group, shooting down two aircraft, collecting 220 weapons of all kinds and 22 signal machines. This was the second key victory, ending the campaign.

At the end of the campaign, Vietnamese forces caused heavy losses to US 3^rd Brigade, 1^st Division 1, and the Saigon government’s Battle Group 7, destroying over 4,000 enemy troops, 10 artillery guns and mortars, more than 100 military vehicles, shooting down two aircraft. This was the first campaign of the armed forces in the southeastern region against the US forces.

The victory of Bau Bang - Dau Tieng Campaign was significant, for it broke part of the enemy forces conducting raids in our base, dealing a tremendous blow to the 3^rd Brigade, 1^st Infantry Division, known as the "Big Red Brother", a most seasoned unit of the US, severely wearing out the will and morale of the US troops.

The new development of the art of campaign operations in this campaign is to actively win and promote the initiative from the beginning to the end of the campaign, focusing forces on key battles and the ability to destroy large number of enemy troops of the Liberation Army in the American Resistance War.

Bau Bang - Dau Tieng Campaign is the outstanding success of the art of tactics application to offensive campaign operations. This was also the first time we used highly concentrated forces (light division level) to conduct a raid in the shortage of preparation time and in daylight direct engagement with the US forces. The victory of the campaign served as the great encouragement for our army and people to be determined to fight and to win US troops.